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The Development of Environmental Criminal Law in
the EU and its Member States
Michael Faure*
Environmental criminal law has gone through a spec-
tacular evolution in Europe in the past 30 years. One
change concerns simply the place of environmental
criminal law. In many countries provisions have now
been incorporated either in a penal code or in a specific
environmental statute. Moreover, in many legal sys-
tems the environment has received a more autono-
mous protection in the criminal law system. And
finally, one can notice in many countries the introduc-
tion of a so-called toolbox approach, implying that a
variety of remedies have been put in place, thus reserv-
ing the criminal law as an ultima ratio. Yet another
important development relates to the fact that Europe
also has taken action with respect to environmental
criminal law with the Environmental Crime Directive
of 2008. It is, however, striking that some of the afore-
mentioned developments in Member States are not
reflected in the Directive. Moreover, the enforcement
of environmental law faces many more challenges
which cannot be faced merely with a criminalization.
There is a serious danger that this only leads to sym-
bolic legislation whereby violations of environmental
law are criminalized, without any guarantee of effec-
tive enforcement. There are therefore still important
challenges to be met with respect to the system of envi-
ronmental criminal law in Europe.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental criminal law has gone through a spec-
tacular evolution in Europe in the past 30 years. In
most countries, these systems of environmental crimi-
nal law started as an annex to mainly administrative
laws. The criminalization was also dependent upon the
scope of administrative law. Moreover, in most legal
systems, countries strongly relied on criminal law;
alternative remedies to handle violations of environ-
mental law were often lacking. Data concerning the
enforcement of environmental criminal law in practice
showed that a large amount of environmental crime
was dismissed given the limited capacity of public pros-
ecutors. Important changes have taken place concern-
ing the shape of environmental criminal law. One
concerns simply the place of environmental criminal
law. In many countries provisions have now been incor-
porated either in a penal code or in a specific environ-
mental statute.
Environmental criminal law is hence no longer merely
an annex to environmental statutes of a mostly admin-
istrative law character. Moreover, in many legal systems
the environment has received a more autonomous pro-
tection in the criminal law system. And finally one can
notice in many countries the introduction of a so-called
toolbox approach, implying that a variety of remedies
(civil penalties, administrative fines, etc.) have been put
in place, thus reserving the criminal law as an ultima
ratio. Yet another important development relates to the
fact that Europe also has taken action with respect to
environmental criminal law through the Environmental
Crime Directive of 2008. It is, however, striking that
some of the aforementioned developments which could
be observed in the Member States, for example, with
respect to the toolbox approach, are not reflected in the
Directive. The enforcement of environmental law faces
many more challenges that cannot be addressed solely
through criminalization. There is a serious danger that
this only leads to symbolic legislation, whereby viola-
tions of environmental law are criminalized, without
any guarantee that an effective enforcement will take
place as well. There are therefore still important chal-
lenges to be met with respect to the system of environ-
mental criminal law in Europe.
In this article, I will first sketch how environmental
criminal law in Europe emerged and developed in the
1970s. I will then highlight that the traditional model of
using criminal law to enforce environmental legislation
was subject to much criticism. Next, I will show that this
critique has to a large extent been incorporated by
Member States, but only to a lesser extent in the Euro-
pean Environmental Crime Directive. The final section
concludes.
THE BEGINNING
When environmental criminal law emerged in the
1970s it was captured in environmental laws that often
had a strongly administrative character, imposing, for
example, an obligation upon an operator to apply for a
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permit to run a particular operation. There were three
specific features of environmental criminal law in that
period that are worth mentioning.
First, criminal law limited itself largely to penalizing the
violation of these administrative obligations. It meant
that environmental crime was not defined in an inde-
pendent manner, for example, by taking into account
the ecological damage caused by a particular behaviour.
It was rather a system supporting the administrative
management of the environment. An example can illus-
trate this. The Belgian (Federal) Service Water Protec-
tion Act of 1971 held that all discharge of waste water
was submitted to a licence.1 The Act further stipulated
which administrative authority could provide the dis-
charge permit and which conditions could be imposed
in the permit. Article 41 of the Act punished inter alia
anyone who violates the provisions of this Act or the
executive orders on the basis of this Act. This example
shows a strong interrelationship between administra-
tive and criminal law. Such examples could be found in
many other countries as well.2
Second, environmental criminal law did not have a very
prominent place in the criminal law system. As a result
of the so-called ‘administrative dependence’ of environ-
mental criminal law, criminal provisions could only be
found at the end of a specific administrative environ-
mental statute. They were used to support the enforce-
ment of administrative duties. As a consequence, it was
often already complicated in many legal systems just to
find the applicable criminal law provisions, as they
could be spread over a wide variety of sectoral environ-
mental laws, regulating, for example, classified installa-
tions, waste, the protection of surface water,
groundwater, air, etc.
A third feature of this traditional approach towards
environmental crime was that there was a strong reli-
ance on criminal law as an enforcement instrument. In
many European Member States, such as Belgium,
France and the United Kingdom (UK), criminal law was
the only mechanism that could be used to enforce (ad-
ministrative) environmental law. Alternative mecha-
nisms that could equally aim at deterrence, such as, for
example, administrative fines, were often not available
(although there were a few noteworthy exceptions, such
as Germany, which had a system of administrative
offences to which administrative fines were applica-
ble).3 At this early stage of the development of
environmental criminal law, alternative sanctions, such
as, for example, administrative fines or civil sanctions,
were not available in most Member States.
CRITIQUE
Those three key features of environmental criminal
law in many Member States were strongly criticized.4
The critique was of a theoretical as well as of an
empirical nature. The critique on the administrative
dependence of the criminal law was that ecological
values were not directly protected through criminal
law. A consequence could be that there could be a case
of serious endangerment of the environment or even
pollution, but if it did not at the same time constitute
a violation of an administrative obligation, interven-
tion by the criminal law would be impossible. But the
reverse was true as well: there could be cases where
administrative obligations were violated as a result of
which the criminal law would automatically be appli-
cable, without any regard for the question whether
this violation also caused serious danger or harm to
the environment. In short, the problem with this (ab-
solute) administrative dependence of environmental
criminal law was that ecological values were not pro-
tected in an autonomous, independent manner. It
seemed that criminal law was only used to back up
the correct functioning of the administrative law sys-
tem.5 The criticism of this absolute administrative
dependence of criminal law was especially formulated
in German criminal law by G€unter Heine, who showed
that criminal law should not under all circumstances
be limited to supporting administrative decisions, but
that there are, depending upon the gravity of the
endangerment of the environment, also ways to pro-
vide a more independent protection by the criminal
law to the environment.6 These ideas were very influ-
ential and led, for example, to a Recommendation by
the 1994 Conference of the Association Internationale
de Droit Penal (AIDP) to provide a more autonomous
1 Surface Water Protection Act of 26 March 1971, Moniteur Belge, 1
May 1971.
2 See, e.g., S.F. Mandiberg and M.G. Faure, ‘A Graduated Punish-
ment Approach to Environmental Crimes: Beyond Vindication of
Administrative Authority in the United States and Europe’, 34:2Colum-
bia Journal of Environmental Law (2009), 447, at 453.
3 See M. Faure and G. Heine, Environmental Criminal Law in the
European Union. Documentation of the Main Provisions with Introduc-
tions (Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law,
2000), at 9–13.
4 This criticism came especially from scholars working at the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law at Freiburg
im Breisgau (Germany) where a project ‘Environmental Protection
through Criminal Law?’ was executed. A good summary of the criti-
cisms is provided in an opinion written by Heine and Meinberg for the
German Lawyers Association in 1988. See G. Heine and V. Meinberg,
Emphfehlen sich €Anderungen im strafrechtlichen Umweltschutz, ins-
besondere in Verbinding mit dem Verwaltungsrecht? Gutachten f€ur
den 57. Deutschen Juristentag (Beck, 1988).
5 See M. Prabhu, ‘General Report. English Version’, International
Review of Penal Law (1994), 699.
6 See, e.g., G. Heine, ‘Aspekte des Umweltstrafrechts im Interna-
tionalen Vergleich’, Goltdammer’s Archiv f€ur Strafrecht (1986), 67;
and G. Heine, ‘Zur Rolle des Strafrechtlichen Umweltschutzes’, 101:3
Zeitschrift f€ur die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaften (1989), 722; G.
Heine, ‘Die Verwaltungsakzessoriet€at im Deutschen Umweltstrafrecht
unter Ber€ucksichtigung des €Osterreichischen Rechts: Aktuelle Prob-
leme und Reform€uberregungen’, €Osterreichische Juristen Zeitung
(1991), 370.
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protection of the environment, stating: ‘Where
offences against the environment are subject to crimi-
nal sanctions, their key elements should be specified
in legislation and not left to be determined by subor-
dinate delegated authorities.’7
There was equally criticism of the fact that environmen-
tal criminal provisions often did not receive a very
prominent place in the criminal law system, but were
merely put at the end of a variety of sectoral environ-
mental laws with an administrative nature. This rather
scattered nature of the provisions made enforcement
more difficult, as it was not easy for prosecutors (and
judges) to find the contents of environmental criminal
law. But scholars equally held that the fact that environ-
mental crime provisions could not be found in the
Criminal Code or in other key legislation had another
consequence. Many practitioners would consider that
environmental crimes would not be as serious since
they were merely contained in specific legislation. As a
result, there was a fear that environmental criminal law
would not be taken seriously by enforcers (prosecutors
and judges) who would primarily focus on prosecuting
provisions in core criminal law.8 Again, this criticism
was taken seriously since the AIDP 1994 Conference
held in Recommendation 21 that: ‘Core crimes against
the environment, that is crimes that are sui generis and
do not depend on other laws for their content, should
be specified in national penal codes.’9
A third critique was geared towards the over-reliance
on criminal law as the only enforcement tool. Especially
criminologists, but also law and economics scholars,
held that criminal law should be considered as an
instrument of last resort, a so-called ultimum reme-
dium, that should only be employed by the legislator
when other instruments (more particularly civil penal-
ties or administrative sanctions) would have failed.
Ayres and Braithwaite presented their famous enforce-
ment pyramid, arguing for a restricted use of criminal
law, only to be applied on the top of the pyramid when
all other instruments would have failed.10 Law and eco-
nomics scholarship also pleaded in favour of a more
restrictive application of the criminal law for reasons of
cost-effectiveness.11 This scholarship argued that the
criminal law system with its high threshold of proof and
severe sanctions will inherently be relatively costly.12 As
a result, prosecutors may tend to use their scarce
resources by only focusing on the gravest violations and
to dismiss the others. Empirical evidence also sup-
ported the fact that in many jurisdictions an over-
whelming part of all environmental crimes were simply
not prosecuted but dismissed.13 It was therefore argued
that the criminal law should only be reserved for those
grave cases where other remedies would not suffice to
provide deterrence. The large dismissal rates would
otherwise lead to underdeterrence. This scholarship
therefore pleaded in favour of complementing environ-
mental criminal law with a system of civil or adminis-
trative penalties, allowing the imposition of fines on
violators.14 This therefore led to a plea in favour of a
toolbox approach, suggesting a more limited role for
criminal law and a greater role for alternatives such as
systems of administrative fines.15 The rationale for this
toolbox approach was especially grounded in the empir-
ical finding that criminal sanctions were rarely imposed
in practice. This underscored the need to have other,
alternative systems supplementing criminal law.
MEMBER STATES LEARNED THE
LESSONS
There have been rather spectacular changes in environ-
mental criminal law in many European Member States
over the past 30 years. The criticisms of the way in
which environmental criminal law was originally for-
mulated have seemingly been heard in many Member
States, leading to important legislative reforms. Exam-
ples of important changes can be provided for the three
specific features of traditional environmental criminal
law and for the related critiques.
Starting with the recommendation of providing a more
autonomous protection of the environment through
criminal law, one can indeed notice reforms whereby
criminal law no longer (only) punishes the violation of
administrative duties. This system of an absolute
administrative dependence has been abandoned in
many legal systems, making room for a more autono-
mous protection of the environment through criminal
law. For example, in some cases provisions were
7 Recommendations of the XVth International Congress on Penal
Law, Recommendation 22, reproduced in: 66:1–2 International
Review of Penal Law (1995), 52.
8 K. Tiedemann, Die Neuordnung des Umweltstrafrechts: Gutach-
tliche Stellungnahme zu dem Entwurf eines Sechzehnten
Strafrechts€anderungsgesetzes (Gesetz zur Bek€ampfung der
Umweltkriminalit€at) (De Gruyter, 1980), at 18.
9 Recommendations of the XVth International Congress on Penal
Law, n. 7 above, Recommendation 21.
10 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending
the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992).
11 A. Ogus, ‘Enforcing Regulation: Do We Need the Criminal Law?’,
in: H. Sj€ogren and G. Skogh (eds.), New Perspectives on Economic
Crime (Edward Elgar, 2004), 42, at 42–46.
12 M.G. Faure, A. Ogus and N. Philipsen, ‘Curbing Consumer Finan-
cial Losses: The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement’, 31:2 Law &
Policy (2009), 161, at 178–181.
13 M.G. Faure and K. Svatikova, ‘Criminal or Administrative Law to
Protect the Environment?’, 24:2 Journal of Environmental Law (2010),
253.
14 A. Ogus and C. Abbot, ‘Sanctions for Pollution: Do We Have the
Right Regime?’, 14:3 Journal of Environmental Law (2002), 283.
15 This is in some literature also referred to as ‘sanction mapping’.
See, e.g., G. Pink and M. Marshall, ‘Sanction Mapping: A Tool for
Fine-Tuning Environmental Regulatory Strategies’, in: M. de Bree and
H. Ruessink (eds.), Innovating Environmental Compliance Assurance
(INECE, 2015), 85.
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introduced punishing unlawful emissions. The unlaw-
fulness could then still consist of a violation of adminis-
trative obligations, but could also be interpreted in a
broader manner. This meant that the criminal liability
was no longer solely attached to a violation of adminis-
trative obligations (which is sometimes referred to as
absolute administrative dependence). As a conse-
quence, even in the absence of specific administrative
obligations an emission could still be considered unlaw-
ful and therefore lead to criminal liability. In other
cases, truly autonomous environmental crimes were
introduced for instances of serious pollution. Examples
of both these developments can be found in Member
States’ legislation. For example, in the Criminal Code of
Portugal, new criminal law provisions target inter alia
concrete endangerment of the environment and serious
pollution.16 And in new provisions in the Criminal Code
in Spain unlawful emissions as well as the engagement
in environmentally dangerous activities, and not just
administrative disobedience, is punished. The provi-
sions in the Criminal Code in Spain punish the endan-
germent of ecological values and focus more on the
concrete endangerment of the environment.17 Also in
Sweden and France changes took place, as a result of
which environmental protection through criminal law
is taking place in a more independent way, that is, not
only in the case of a violation of administrative duties.
For example, in France Article 421.2 was added in the
Criminal Code, specifying the crime of ‘ecological ter-
rorism’.18 In most of those examples, there still is a rela-
tionship between the formulation of environmental
crime and administrative law. The major change
compared to the old system, however, is that criminal
behaviour no longer only consists of a violation of
administrative duties. The criminal provisions focus
more on the resulting endangerment or harm to the
environment rather than merely on administrative
disobedience.
Concerning the second element, the place of environ-
mental criminal law, important changes have also taken
place. These consist on the one hand of an incorpora-
tion of environmental crime into the Criminal Code and
on the other hand of general codifications of environ-
mental law, equally incorporating environmental
criminal law. Countries like Germany and the Nether-
lands already had incorporated criminal provisions in
their Criminal Codes in the 1980s. Germany introduced
environmental criminal law provisions in 1980,19 fol-
lowed by the Netherlands (1989),20 Finland (1995),
Portugal (1995) and Spain (1995). In other countries,
criminal provisions were incorporated into a code or
special environmental law, aiming at the integration of
environmental law. That was the case in the UK (1990),
Denmark (1991), Ireland (1992) and Sweden (1998).
Also in the three regions that in Belgium had compe-
tences with respect to environmental law, environmen-
tal criminal law became integrated in environmental
enforcement decrees and ordinances.21 These integra-
tion efforts had to deal with the problem that previ-
ously, criminal provisions were scattered over a large
variety of different regulations and therefore difficult to
find.
Examples can also be provided of a trend towards an
increasing use of the toolbox approach, mentioned
above, implying that criminal law would no longer be the
only available remedy in case of a violation of environ-
mental regulations. Germany and Austria already had
models allowing particular violations to be exclusively
dealt with through administrative penal law. The same
model was also introduced in Portugal. Major changes
also took place in the UK, where the criticism that was
formulated on the enforcement regime in the law and
economics literature was taken up by Richard Macrory,
who carried out a wide-ranging review of regulatory
enforcement regimes for the UK Cabinet Office. He
advocated a reduced reliance on criminal law and a
greater use of administrative penalties.22 His recommen-
dations were implemented with the Regulatory Enforce-
ment and Sanctions Act (2008) which gave particular
agencies (like the Environment Agency) the power to
impose civil sanctions (being in fact monetary penal-
ties).23 Similar changes equally took place in the various
regions in Belgium. To an important extent a
16 See M.G. Faure and G. Heine, n. 3 above, at 283.
17 Ibid., at 293–294.
18 Article 421.2 of the French Penal Code reads: ‘The introduction into
the atmosphere, on the ground, in the soil, in food stuff or its ingredi-
ents, or in waters, including territorial waters, of any substance liable
to imperil human or animal health or the natural environment, is an act
of terrorism where it is committed intentionally in connection with an
individual or collective undertaking, whose aim is to seriously disturb
public order through intimidation or terror.’ See the Penal Code of
France, found at: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cid
Texte=LEGITEXT000006070719>. On this provision, see also D.
Guihal, Droit Repressif de l’Environnement, 2nd edn (Economica,
2000), at 541 and M. Prieur, Le Droit de l’Environnement, 4th edn
(Dalloz, 2001), at 857–858. There is, however, criticism on the specific
formulation of this crime as its scope of application is relatively limited.
19 They are incorporated in Section 29 of the German Code, at para-
graphs 324ff., under the title ‘Straftaten gegen die Umwelt’ (crimes
against the environment). For comments, see G. Heine, ‘Allemagne.
Crimes against the Environment’, 65 Revue Internationale de Droit
Penal (1994), 731, at 733.
20 See C. Waling et al., ‘Crimes against the Environment’, 65 Interna-
tional Review of Penal Law (1994), 1065, at 1080–1082.
21 See, e.g., M.G. Faure and A. Stas, ‘The Flemish High Council of
Environmental Enforcement: The Role of an Environmental Enforce-
ment Network in a New Coordinated Environmental Enforcement
Landscape within the Flemish Region 2009–2014’, in: M. Faure, P.
Desmedt and A. Stas (eds.), Environmental Enforcement Networks.
Concept, Implementation and Effectiveness (Edward Elgar, 2015),
490.
22 R.B. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective.
Final Report (2006), found at: <http://webarchive.nationalarchive
s.gov.uk/20121212135622/http:/www.bis.gov.uk/files/file44593.pdf>.
23 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 (commencement
No. 2) Order 2009, SI 2009/550 and Environmental Civil Sanctions
(England) Order 2010, SI 2010/1157. See further M.G. Faure and
K. Svatikova, n. 13 above, at 266–271.
ª 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
142
MICHAEL FAURE RECIEL 26 (2) 2017
decriminalization took place, allowing specific regulatory
offences to be handled with administrative fines. Crimes
would still be forwarded to the public prosecutor, but the
prosecutor can decide to forward the case to an adminis-
trative agency which can impose an administrative fine.
THE CRITIQUE NOT
INCORPORATED IN EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW AS A REACTION
TO AN IMPLEMENTATION DEFICIT
Another major change in the past 30 years consists of
the fact that when environmental criminal law was orig-
inally developed in the Member States, Europe played
no role whatsoever as far as harmonization of criminal
law was concerned. There was, however, an important
body of environmental law that had been developed,
largely as a remedy for transboundary pollution prob-
lems.24
Common environmental standards could avoid Mem-
ber States from getting involved in a race to the bottom
towards ever lower standards of environmental protec-
tion. Notwithstanding the increasing volume of envi-
ronmental directives and regulations, the European
Commission could at the beginning of this century only
notice that there was a serious problem with the imple-
mentation of environmental law at the Member State
level, an implementation and enforcement deficit.
Changes in the treaties and developments in the case
law of the (then) European Union (EU) Court of Justice
all had the goal of forcing Member States to better
implement the environmental acquis. The Francovich
case created the possibility to hold Member States liable
for damage resulting from the lack of implementation
of directives;25 the case law also imposed a duty on
Member States to effectively enforce national legisla-
tion implementing (environmental) directives.26 The
Commission brought a large number of cases before the
Court of Justice for lack of implementation of (many
environmental) directives, and the Court increasingly
used the (new) possibility to impose a penalty payment
upon those Member States that consistently failed to
implement. However, notwithstanding those develop-
ments the implementation deficit persisted. It is inter
alia within that framework that at the beginning of this
century a variety of initiatives were taken to push
Member States to use criminal law to enforce legislation
transposing environmental directives.27 However, at
the time the general idea was that the European legisla-
tor lacked the competence to force Member States
towards introducing criminal sanctions in their imple-
menting legislation. But in a well-known decision of the
Court of Justice of the EU of 13 September 2005 in case
C-176/0328 the Court held that although:
as a general rule neither criminal law nor the rules of crimi-
nal procedure fall within community competence . . . the last
mentioned finding does not prevent the community legisla-
ture, when the application of effective, proportionate and
dissuasive penalties by the competent national authorities is
an essential measure for combatting serious environmental
offences, from taking measures which relate to the criminal
law of the Member State which it considers necessary in
order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environ-
mental protection are fully effective.
This case law allowed the creation of the Environmental
Crime Directive (2008/99)29 and a related Directive
with respect to ship-source pollution (2009/123).30
The core of the Environmental Crime Directive is that
its Article 5 holds that ‘Member States shall take the
necessary measures to ensure that the offences referred
to in Articles 3 and 4 are punishable by effective, pro-
portionate and dissuasive criminal penalties’.31
A DIRECTIVE WITH A LIMITED
SCOPE
When one views the structure of the Directive one can
ask the question to what extent it has taken into account
the criticism that was formulated in the literature
regarding on the one hand the need for a more indepen-
dent, autonomous formulation of environmental crimi-
nal law and on the other hand the trend towards a
‘toolbox’ approach, not just focusing merely on enforce-
ment through the criminal law. It seems that those rec-
ommendations were not followed in the Directive.32
Article 3 of the Directive holds that the measures shall
24 See R. Revesz, ‘Federalism and Environmental Regulation: An
Overview’, in: R. Revesz, P. Sands and R. Stewart (eds.), Environ-
mental Law: The Economy and Sustainable Development (Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 37.
25 CJEU, Case C-6/90, Francovich and others v. Italian Republic,
[1990] ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
26 See further J. Jans and H. Vedder, European Environmental Law
after Lisbon, 4th edn (Europa Law, 2012), at 163–170.
27 See, e.g., F. Comte, ‘Criminal Environmental Law and Community
Competence’, 12:5 European Environmental Law Review (2003), 147;
F. Comte, ‘Environmental Crime and the Police in Europe: A Panor-
ama and Possible Paths for Future Action’, 15:7 European Environ-
mental Law Review (2006), 190; and M. Hedemann-Robinson, ‘The
Emergence of European Union Environmental Criminal Law: A Quest
for Solid Foundations’, 16:3 Environmental Liability (2008), 71.
28 CJEU, Case C-176/03, Commission of the European Communities
v Council of the European Union, [2005] ECLI:EU:C:2005:542.
29 Directive 2008/99/EC of 19 November 2008 on the Protection of the
Environment through Criminal Law, [2008] OJ L328/28 (‘Environmen-
tal Crime Directive’).
30 Directive 2009/123/EC of 21 October 2009 Amending Directive
2005/35/EC on Ship-Source Pollution and on the Introduction of
Penalties for Infringements, [2009] OJ L280/52.
31 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 29 above, Article 5.
32 M.G. Faure, ‘The Environmental Crime Directive 2008/99/EC’, 1
European Journal of Consumer Law (2011), 193.
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ensure that particular conducts will constitute a crimi-
nal offence ‘when unlawful and committed intentionally
or at least with serious negligence’.33
Article 2 defines unlawfulness as meaning an act which
violates:
the legislation adopted pursuant to the EC treaty and listed
in annex A; or with regards to activities covered by the Eura-
tom Treaty, the legislation adopted pursuant to the Euratom
Treaty and listed in annex B; or a law, and administrative
regulation of a Member State or a decision taken by a com-
petent authority of a Member State that gives effect to the
community legislation referred to in (i) or (ii).34
The provision refers to either a violation of the Euro-
pean environmental directives or a violation of
domestic (usually administrative) environmental law,
implementing European environmental directives.
There is no role for autonomous, independent crimes
whereby the criminal law could be applied even in
the absence of a violation of administrative obliga-
tions.
Also, the suggestions concerning the toolbox
approach have apparently not been heard by the
drafters of the Directive. Recital 3 of the Environ-
mental Crime Directive explicitly holds that criminal
penalties ‘demonstrate a social disapproval of a quali-
tatively different nature compared to administrative
penalties or a compensation mechanism under civil
law’.35 As a consequence, Article 5 prescribes that
specific violations need to be regarded as criminal
offences in the national legislation implementing the
Directive. The Environmental Crime Directive thus
does not mention administrative penalties at all. This
is striking and regrettable from a theoretical perspec-
tive (an over-reliance on criminal law and no atten-
tion at all for alternatives); it is also striking that the
Environmental Crime Directive gives priority to crim-
inal law whereas I just sketched that within Member
States a trend could be discovered whereby equally
attention is paid to alternative methods of enforcing
environmental regulation. As such, given the focus of
the Directive (on environmental crimes), it is unsur-
prising that the Directive only deals with criminaliza-
tion as the only tool to remedy environmental harm.
But it is precisely that focus on criminal law as the
only instrument to remedy environmental harm that
is problematic. A directive with a wider focus, also
on other instruments, could better fit in the recent
literature that advocated the toolbox approach and
could have appropriately restricted the role of crimi-
nal law.
NO SOLUTION FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION DEFICIT
Probably even more problematic is the fact that the
mere criminalization of environmental harm (forced by
Directive 2008/99) does not solve the implementation
deficit. The problem is that today a Member State could
still opt to transpose particular directives in its national
law; it could equally follow the duty to incorporate
criminal sanctions in its domestic legislation, but that
Member State could also do very little or nothing con-
cerning the effective enforcement of the domestic legis-
lation implementing the environmental acquis. The
problem is not so much that the applicable sanctions in
Member States are different, but that the mere decision
to criminalize has no influence either on decisions of
public prosecutors to dismiss particular cases of envi-
ronmental crime, or on the discretionary powers of the
judge to choose the applicable sanction. More funda-
mental is the problem that Europe does not, as does the
United States, have an Environmental Protection
Agency which would have enforcement powers to verify,
for example, environmental quality (or more simply,
effective compliance with the environmental acquis) in
the Member States. With a bit of exaggeration one can
hold that the only thing which is effectively controlled is
whether Member States on paper correctly transpose
environmental directives. Sure, one can point at a for-
mal obligation of Member States not only to transpose,
but also to enforce the domestic legislation transposing
EU law.36 And one can fortunately also notice that the
evaluation studies checking compliance by the Member
States now increasingly also verify whether Member
States courts do indeed impose effective, dissuasive and
proportionate sanctions as required by the Environ-
mental Crime Directive. For example, the evaluation
carried out for the European Commission by the con-
sultancy Milieu opined that Sweden did not correctly
implement the Environmental Crime Directive, as sanc-
tions that are in practice imposed for corporate envi-
ronmental crime are too low and can therefore not be
considered as being effective, proportionate and dissua-
sive.37 But the major problem is that essential informa-
tion to check effective compliance, such as the amount
of classified installations that have to be inspected, the
number of available inspectors, the number of viola-
tions and the result of those inspections, is lacking com-
pletely. Data collection in this respect is problematic at
the Member State level. And even if Member States do
collect this data, it is not adequately passed on to the
European Commission. There is a legislative document
33 Environmental Crime Directive, n. 29 above, Article 3.
34 Ibid., Article 2.
35 Ibid., recital 3.
36 See J. Jans and H. Vedder, n. 26 above, at 163–170.
37 Milieu, ‘Evaluation Study on the Implementation of Directive 2008/
99/EC on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law by
Member States’ (2015), found at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/
files/environment/nr_se_redacted_en.pdf>, at 13.
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which could to an important extent deal with this prob-
lem, namely, Recommendation 2001/331,38 which pro-
vides for minimum criteria for environmental
inspections in the Member States. This document pre-
scribes in detail how environmental inspections should
be carried out, how site visits should take place and that
specific plans for environmental inspections need to be
developed. Moreover, it equally holds that Member
States should report data inter alia on staffing, details
of the environmental inspections carried out, an evalua-
tion of the success or failure of the plans for inspections,
etc. As such, this is an excellent document, but it is in
practice barely communicated to the Commission.39
But again, in addition to this information, formal writ-
ten reports as required by the Recommendation cannot
be found.
What should happen is that this recommendation
should be transposed into a binding document. It
seems, however, that within the current anti-European
spirit it is not very likely that such a document, which
would likely be felt by Member States as imposing more
administrative reporting duties upon them will become
binding. But a consequence of the current situation is
that it is (unfortunately not only theoretically, but also
in practice) possible that specific Member States could
engage into a race to the bottom, meaning that they
would still formally implement the environmental ac-
quis, but for the remainder do very little to enforce the
domestic legislation transposing EU law.40 This danger-
ous tendency can only be countered by organizing a har-
monized and effective system of data collection on
monitoring and inspections in Member States.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Environmental criminal law, both in the Member States
and in the EU, has gone through a remarkable develop-
ment over the past decades. Environmental criminal
law has changed from a system where its role was
originally reduced to back up administrative obligations
as a supplement to sectoral environmental legislation,
towards more autonomous provisions with a more
prominent place in either criminal codes or special
environmental statutes. Moreover, based on empirical
research showing that large amounts of criminal cases
were dismissed, many countries have introduced a tool-
box approach, providing for other remedies as an alter-
native to the criminal law, thus allowing criminal law to
play its role as ultimum remedium. Environmental
criminal law in that sense has grown up.
The EU has rightly shown great concern with the imple-
mentation of the environmental acquis, resulting from
the need for a collaboration between the EU level (fixing
the standards) and the Member State level (responsible
for enforcement). It is against that backdrop that the
Environmental Crime Directive was drafted. However,
merely forcing Member States to criminalize environ-
mental harm may only lead to window dressing and
symbolic legislation. The first-best solution to the prob-
lem would be to award enforcement powers to the
European Environment Agency or a similar agency that
would be allowed to verify outcomes of the implementa-
tion of the Directive, that is, actual improvement of
environmental quality in the Member States. Unfortu-
nately, within the current anti-Europe atmosphere it is
not very likely that this is going to happen soon. It is for
that reason understandable that as a second-best solu-
tion other remedies are sought, for example, forcing
Member States not only to correctly transpose environ-
mental directives, but also to threaten the violation of
implementing legislation with effective, proportionate
and dissuasive sanctions. It is also a positive develop-
ment that nowadays the verification of implementation
not only entails checking whether formal sanctions
within the Member States can be considered as effec-
tive, proportionate and dissuasive, but that implemen-
tation studies also verify sanctions that are imposed in
practice. However, the problem remains that without
data on effective enforcement of environmental law in
the Member States, a mere formal duty to provide for
criminal sanctions in legislation will not necessarily
change that much on the ground. This problem illus-
trates the crisis in European environmental law. Mem-
ber States could in theory hide behind the formal
implementation of European environmental legislation
without providing any information on how this legisla-
tion is enforced in practice. Information on sanctions
imposed may be one step, but this is largely insufficient
as long as data, for example, on total enforcement
capacity and enforcement strategies are lacking. It
seems clear that this lack of data may jeopardize one of
the central goals of European environmental law,
namely, the prevention of a race to the bottom between
Member States. More formal harmonization (e.g., of
criminal sanctions, which is now also possible after the
Lisbon Treaty) will probably only lead to more symbolic
legislation without clear effects on improving
38 Recommendation of 4 April 2001 Providing for Minimum Criteria for
Environmental Inspections in the Member States, [2001] OJ 118/41.
39 On the website of the Commission one cannot find formal written
reports regarding the implementation of Recommendation 2001/331,
as required by the Recommendation. There is some guidance on the
implementation and some instructions (e.g., on <http://europa.eu/legis
lation_summaries/environment/general_provisions/L2808_en.htm>)
and there is guidance by the EU network for the implementation and
enforcement of environmental law (IMPEL) on point VIII of the Recom-
mendation. See IMPEL Guidance on Point VIII of the Recommenda-
tion of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 April 2001
Providing for Minimum Criteria for Environmental Inspections in the
Member States (2001/331/EC).
40 It was argued that especially after the EU enlargement to the east
(in 2004) there was a serious danger that the industry in the EU (bene-
fitting from enlargement) would lobby in favour of a lenient enforce-
ment of directives. See M.G. Faure and J.S. Johnston, ‘The Law and
Economics of Environmental Federalism: Europe and the United
States Compared’, 27:3 Virginia Environmental Law Journal (2009),
205.
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environmental quality. A much more effective tool
would be the imposition of a duty on Member States to
provide verifiable information on effective enforce-
ment. The Recommendation of 2001 providing for min-
imum criteria for environmental inspections in the
Member States is in that respect an important tool. If
Member States really take European environmental law
seriously, they should stop their opposition against
attempts to change that Recommendation into a bind-
ing directive. And if that were a step too far as far as
political feasibility is concerned, it remains important
to think about adequate second-best solutions which
allow the European Commission to obtain more accu-
rate information on the real and actual enforcement of
environmental directives in practice. That seems to be a
crucial step to transform all those symbolic steps taken
so far into an effective harmonization of environmental
quality in Europe.
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